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Introduction 
Over the last decade, but certainly since the dramatic events of 9-11-01, many 
policy makers and academics have come to believe that the social cohesion of western 
societies is being steadily undermined by growing political alienation among sections 
of the population and by increasing ethnic and social polarization. Schools are called 
upon to do the repair work, especially in the compulsory education phase; they are 
expected to foster the civic values and overarching identities that are seen as crucial in 
maintaining overall order and harmony. Implicitly, schools and the education system 
more broadly are attributed a great deal of agency and effectiveness. 
 However, the question whether public education is indeed capable of fostering 
such values has been explored only for some facets of education. There is a vast 
literature on the effect of the curriculum, instructional approaches and educational 
attainment, but studies exploring the impact of system properties at the national level 
are, to our knowledge, next to non-existent. Our study intends to address this gap. It 
explores whether civic values and identities are related to the degree of system 
differentiation in the compulsory education phase. We will distinguish between the 
degree and kind of territorial differentiation (division of powers between the national, 
local and school levels regarding curriculum, textbooks and assessment) and the 
degree and kind of pedagogical differentiation (grouping of students by ability and 
tracking). In other words, are unitary states with national curricula in a better position 
to bring about civic values and identities than federal ones? Likewise, are states with 
 2 
single-type comprehensive schools more effective in this regard than states with 
schools differing by profile and status? These system characteristics will be related to 
both levels and disparities of values and identities. Disparities, particularly those 
across social divides, are relevant to policy makers who are interested in combating 
pockets of alienation and disengagement among socially and ethnically disadvantaged 
groups as well as in achieving overall high mean levels of support for these values. 
Our outcomes of interest are ethnic tolerance and patriotism since it is these qualities 
that many policy makers seek to foster.  
 
Social Cohesion Values 
Interestingly, the growing ethnic diversity of western countries due to 
immigration has led policy makers to become concerned about two quite different 
values. On the one hand, they see the need for fostering acceptance and respect for 
people of different cultural backgrounds – i.e., ethnic tolerance. On the other hand, 
they are apprehensive about the possible negative effect of growing diversity on social 
cohesion and advocate the reinforcement of a common overarching national identity 
through the curriculum as a means to neutralize this perceived effect (see Appendix 1 
[ON-LINE VERSION ONLY] for a brief review of policies pursuing these 
objectives). This identity is meant to be inclusive, in the sense that the native majority 
and immigrant minorities should be able to embrace it with equal ease, and is 
consequently based on political markers (e.g. the flag, the constitution, the anthem, 
the political history of a country). It is thus identification with the country and the 
nation politically conceived – in other words patriotism – that is promoted. 
Remarkably, few policy makers question whether it is possible to cultivate 
ethnic tolerance and patriotism simultaneously. Many seem to assume that the latter 
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represents a neutral overarching expression of belonging to the country of residence 
which is fully compatible with a tolerant stance toward other ethnic groups. However, 
multiculturalists have argued that no identity can be culturally neutral (Feinberg 
1998). Identity formation always involves processes of inclusion and exclusion and 
the favoring of in-groups over out-groups. National identities, even those based 
primarily on political markers, privilege the language and culture of the dominant 
group, and this will complicate their adoption by ethnic minorities. People expressing 
a strong attachment with the nation (i.e. a high level of national pride / patriotism) 
will tend to have exclusionary views on cultural others. Indeed, analyzing survey data 
from 21 countries,  Mikael Hjerm (2004) found a negative relation between ethnic 
tolerance and national pride. 
Nevertheless, national identities are likely to vary in the degree to which they 
include and exclude cultural others. Identities based on ethno-cultural markers (i.e. 
“ethnic” or “thick” identities) are mainly exclusionary, while those grounded on civic 
and political principles (“civic” or “thin” identities) are inclusive (Kohn 1944). 
According to Rogers Brubaker (1992), ethnic and civic identities can be seen as 
important discourses framing a country’s immigration, naturalization and integration 
policies. Ethnic identities are said to prevail in the German-speaking and East 
European nations while civic identities are considered to be characteristic of France, 
the Low Countries, Switzerland and the English-speaking countries (Kohn 1944; 
Greenfeld and Chirot 1994). Consequently, in the former countries, fostering 
patriotism could well have the effect of undermining tolerance by reinforcing ethnic 
identities and thus contributing to exclusion and xenophobia. Although Kohn’s 
ethnic-East / civic-West framework has been severely criticized on both theoretical 
and empirical grounds (for instance, see Kuzio 2001), we have to take seriously the 
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idea of stable cross-national differences in the nature of identity – and their possible 
impact on patriotism and ethnic tolerance – because lasting differences have been 
found between European states in immigration and integration policies (see 
Koopmans 2010) which correspond quite closely to Kohn’s framework. 
The notion of qualitatively different national identities is also relevant because 
there may be a link between the decision-making structure of an education system and 
the kind of national identity prevailing. For instance, federative states, particularly 
those with two or more official languages such as Canada, may be more successful in 
promoting a form of patriotism compatible with ethnic tolerance because their 
national identities are thin by necessity. Conversely, old homogenous nation-states 
with centralized systems could well promote intolerant forms of patriotism because 
their national identities are likely to be thicker and more exclusionary. 
 
Education Systems and Social Cohesion Values 
It is not difficult to see the theoretical connection between the two 
aforementioned modes of system differentiation and disparities of civic values. The 
degree of pedagogical differentiation (i.e., ability grouping and tracking) is likely to 
influence disparities across social, ethnic and gender divides in particular. This is 
because it is connected with segregation which, in turn, can be expected to affect such 
disparities. Ability grouping has the effect of assigning children of disadvantaged 
social and ethnic backgrounds disproportionately to low status (pre-) vocational tracks 
(Green et al. 2006; Gamoran 2001), resulting in more social and ethnic segregation 
across schools (or across classes within schools) in pedagogically differentiated 
systems compared to common schooling ones (Jenkins et al. 2008; Crul and 
Vermeulen 2003). Social and ethnic segregation is likely to result in greater values 
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disparities across groups for three reasons. First, the social and ethnic groups 
overrepresented in low status tracks may well experience their segregation as 
involuntary, in a sense that they feel excluded from more prestigious tracks. As a 
result, they are likely to express significantly higher levels of alienation and lower 
levels of civic mindedness than the more privileged groups in high status tracks. 
Second, by enhancing intra-group solidarity and inter-group difference, the 
segregation produced by a tracked education system engenders different life worlds 
with different norms and values for different social, ethnic and gender groups (van de 
Werfhorst 2007). Third, this effect of segregation could be reinforced by curriculum 
differences since pupils in academic tracks are likely to receive qualitatively different 
and more intensive education in civics and social affairs than those in vocational 
tracks (ibid 2007). 
Few studies have investigated the link between pedagogical differentiation and 
disparities of civic outcomes empirically, and they explore a limited set of civic 
outcomes. Using data of the International Adult Literacy Survey  (IALS) on adult 
skills, Herman van de Werfhorst (2007) found that the difference in civic participation 
rates between adults who had been in vocational versus academic tracks during school 
was larger in early tracking systems compared to comprehensive systems. His study 
thus showed that system characteristics indeed have an effect on inequalities of civic 
participation, though he could only explore system effects on civic participation and 
political interest. In addition, Frank Stevens (2002) found that in Flanders the 
vocationally trained pupils were more ethnocentric, anti-democratic, and “tougher on 
crime.” 
Territorial differentiation can likewise be expected to influence values 
disparities. Federal systems are likely to produce greater disparities, particularly 
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across regions, than unitary systems because sub-state authorities have much more 
autonomy regarding curriculum matters in the former. This sub-state autonomy is 
likely to yield a great variety of curriculum guidelines, subject matter, learning 
materials and teaching practices across schools within the country, which may 
produce large values disparities in general. To the extent that the residential patterns 
of social, ethnic and religious groups coincide with territorial administrative units, a 
federal structure may also well yield larger disparities across social, ethnic and 
religious groups. 
Patrick Wolf and Stephen Macedo (2005) assume the administrative structure 
of a state to affect civic disparities when they argue that a national regulatory 
framework helps prevent school autonomy from showing its divisive effects. Shared 
values can be maintained, they contend, under conditions of school pluralism 
provided there is some minimal degree of national regulation applying to all schools. 
Remarkably, none of the contributions in their edited volume explores this claim 
empirically, possibly due to the lack of data on student civic attitudes at the time the 
contributions for the book were written. We know of only one study that investigated 
the link between territorial differentiation and disparities, in this case, academic 
achievement. Nathalie Mons (2007) found that a centralized structure, particularly 
with regard to the curriculum, certification of teachers and teacher recruitment, is 
associated with relatively small between-school and between-student disparities in 
academic achievement. 
The theoretical link between both modes of system differentiation and levels 
of civic values in general is not straightforward. However, a distinct theoretical 
argument can be made with respect to ethnic tolerance and patriotism, our two 
outcomes of interest. The argument is that social and ethnic mixing fosters intergroup 
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respect and overarching identities provided a number of conditions are met (Allport 
1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006).
1
 By implication social and ethnic segregation 
should lead to the opposite: narrow group-based identities, prejudice and inter-group 
hostility ). This argumentation clearly provides the basis for Walter Feinberg’s (1998) 
praise of the common school, because children of different social and ethnic 
backgrounds are grouped together, learn to cooperate with each other and share a 
common school experience. In turn, this will contribute to bridging identities, 
engagement with wider societal issues and intergroup tolerance, qualities which are 
often seen as underpinning liberal democracy.
2
  Thus, to the extent that patriotic 
sentiments represents these bridging identities, we can expect systems with minimal 
pedagogical differentiation to show the highest levels of both ethnic tolerance and 
patriotism. 
The relation between pedagogical differentiation and levels of civic attitudes 
has not been explored extensively either. In a cross-national study of 20 countries, 
Marie Duru-Bellat et al. (2008) found comprehensive schooling to be associated with 
a cooperative spirit, but they could not assess whether support for such values also 
reflects greater ethnic tolerance and more encompassing forms of belonging. 
Similarly, there have been numerous empirical studies from various national contexts 
showing that desegregated or integrated (i.e., mixed faith) schools have positive 
effects for inter-cultural friendships, comfort in dealing with interracial settings, 
forgiveness and reconciliation (for an overview, see Schofield 2001). However, since 
most of these studies focus on a single country, they have not addressed system 
characteristics such as the degree of pedagogical differentiation. 
Finally, there are sources of support for theorizing a link between territorial 
differentiation and patriotism.
3
 The high levels of autonomy enjoyed by sub-state 
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entities in federations are likely to complicate identification and engagement with the 
national level by directing the attention of citizens to the sub-state level. Indeed, the 
literature on nation-building and state formation has noted the propensity of young 
states and states desiring to catch up socio-economically with more advanced states to 
establish unitary education systems with national curricula for the purpose of 
congealing national identity and fostering cultural homogeneity (Green 1990; Kolstoe 
2000). Generally, such states are reluctant to transfer powers to regions or national 
minorities as they fear that such policies might have centrifugal effects. 
The preceding leads us to formulate the following hypotheses: 
1. The larger the degree of pedagogical differentiation, the larger the value 
disparities across ethnic and social cleavages; 
2. The larger the degree of territorial differentiation, the larger the value 
disparities in general and those across ethnic and social cleavages;
4
 
3. The larger the degree of pedagogical differentiation, the lower the levels of 
ethnic tolerance and patriotism; 
4. The larger the degree of territorial differentiation, the lower the levels of 
patriotism. 
 
Data and Indicators 
We merged two datasets to explore the relationships between system 
characteristics and civic values. 
 
Measures of System Characteristics 
The first dataset, compiled by Mons (2004, 2007), includes a set of 80 
indicators. This dataset documents educational policies and system characteristics 
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relating to compulsory education in OECD countries and in some emerging countries 
in the beginning of the 1990s. The Mons dataset is a useful complement to the 
international (e.g., UNESCO and OECD) data already available on education systems 
for several reasons. First, existing data provide mainly quantitative indicators (e.g., he 
percentage of schools engaging in ability grouping), while the Mons data include 
relevant qualitative indicators (e.g., rigid tracking, flexible setting). Second, unlike 
other datasets which merely present a loose collection of individual indicators, the 
Mons dataset includes typological variables reflecting clusters of quantitative and 
qualitative indicators observable in distinct groups of countries. Such variables make 
it easier to identify distinct national education regimes. 
The pedagogical differentiation variable in the Mons dataset is comprehensive 
in that it not only includes the traditional opposition between early selection and 
undifferentiated school organisation but also four other forms of differentiation: a) the 
kind of ability-grouping practised (setting, permanent ability-grouping in ISCED 1 
and 2, permanent ability-grouping starting from ISCED 2, no ability-grouping), b) the 
kind of differentiated teaching provided (extra lessons following the common 
curriculum for all students, only enrichment classes or remedial classes  for a 
selection of students, no form of differentiated teaching) and c) the pace of 
progression through the school years (automatic promotion, weak, average, strong 
rates of repetition) and d) non-completion rates (low, average, high levels of non-
completion). A principle component analysis on these five forms of differentiation 
based on a sample of OECD countries, produced two dimensions which were labelled 
‘degree of selection’ and ‘degree of individualised/collective teaching.’ (see Mons 
2007, 187-189, for the results of this analysis). 
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Mapping the country scores on these dimensions in a scatter plot, Mons (ibid)  
identified four distinct groups of countries, representing a distinct model of 
compulsory schooling organisation (see Table 1). These models constitute the 
categories (or types) of the pedagogical differentiation variable. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The first model, which we labelled as “separation,” is marked by early 
selection organized at the end of primary school, high rates of grade repetition, 
frequent setting in primary school, enrichment classes, little help for children with 
academic difficulties and average levels of non-completion. This type characterizes 
the systems of central European countries (Austria, Germany, Hungary, Switzerland). 
In addition to the model of separation, the scatter plot produced three distinct 
models of comprehensive schooling, refuting the assumption that countries with 
comprehensive systems can be classified as a single group. The first model, that we 
shall call the “individualised integration” group is the archetype of the comprehensive 
school concept.  The students must follow the same curriculum, at a similar pace, and 
if possible with the same peers and teachers throughout primary and lower secondary 
education. This model has the following characteristics: (a) a long common 
curriculum, (b) automatic promotion of students, (c) no or almost no setting, (d) 
individualised lessons, which are an integral part of the teaching process and concern 
all students, not just the weakest ones, and (e) low levels of non-completion. 
Countries characterized by this model include countries in the Nordic region 
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,  Sweden) and in Asia (Japan and South Korea).   
Another model of a comprehensive school organisation we term “diverse 
integration”. This model is characterized by: (a) a long common curriculum without 
official selection; (b) automatic promotion or very low repetition rates in primary 
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school and almost non-existent repetition in secondary school (due to a credit system); 
(c) flexible ability-grouping for basic subjects with within-class grouping in primary 
school and a differentiated offer of lessons according to the academic ability of 
students in each of the disciplines in secondary school; (d) individualised teaching, 
often with enrichment classes for talented students; (e) low levels of non-completion. 
Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States are emblematic of 
this model. 
A third model of comprehensive school organization we call “uniform 
integration.” This model combines the following properties: (a) a long common 
curriculum; (b) high repetition rates; (c) remedial classes only; (d) rigid ability-
grouping starting from lower secondary; (e) high levels of non-completion. This 
model principally characterises the Latin-European family (France, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain). 
The categorical variable capturing the degree and kind of territorial 
differentiation concentrates on issues of curriculum design (choice of subjects and 
number of teaching hours), textbook choice and modes of assessment and describes 
the division of powers and activities across the national, local and school levels on 
these issues. As shown in Table 1, its categories represent five models: (1) the federal 
model, in which sub-national entities are in charge of curriculum design, textbook 
choice and external student assessment ( Australia, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, 
United States); (2) the quasi-centralized model, in which the three main functions 
described above are the exclusive responsibility of the central state (France, Italy, 
Portugal of the mid-1990s); (3) the model of “collaboration,” in which there is 
limited transfer of powers to schools and local authorities constrained by strong 
national frameworks and the existence of national external student assessment (as 
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seen in some Nordic countries such as Denmark); (4) the “school autonomy” model, 
in which frequent national external assessments is combined with strong school 
autonomy in matters of curriculum design, guided only by broad curriculum 
objectives at the national level (England, Hungary, Sweden); (5) the 
“decentralization” model, in which local authorities assume major responsibilities for 
curriculum design, textbook choice, and modes of assessment (e.g., Russia and 
Spain).  
Although we have described both variables as categorical (identifying 
qualitatively different education system traditions), we can rank the different 
categories of pedagogical differentiation according to the degree of grouping by 
ability and those of territorial differentiation according to the division of powers 
across the national, local and school level. With regard to pedagogical differentiation, 
grouping by ability is practically non-existent in the individualised integration 
category, while it is the defining characteristic of the separation model. The other two 
categories of this variable fall in between these two extremes. In view of the 
hypotheses stated above, we consequently would expect disparities of civic values to 
be smallest in the individualised integration category and largest in the separation 
group. Likewise, levels of support for civic values should be highest in the former and 
lowest in the latter. 
A similar logic applies to the categories of territorial differentiation. Clearly, 
the national level is least important in federal states and most important in centralized 
states. Consequently, we expect disparities of civic values to be smallest in the 
centralized model and largest in the federal group of countries and levels of support to 
be highest in the former and lowest in the latter. The remaining categories are 
anticipated to show average disparities and levels of support. 
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Measures of Civic Values 
The second dataset is the IEA Civic Education Study (henceforth Cived 
study), which provides data on the dependent variable of this research – civic values. 
The Cived study consists of a large scale test and survey conducted in April 1999 
among a sample of 90,000 14-year-old students and 4,500 school principals in 28 
countries worldwide (Torney-Purta et al 2001).
5
 A major advantage of the Cived 
study, in addition to the large national samples (3000 students and more) and the low 
non-response rates, is the inclusion of ready-made composite scales in the database, 
which have been tested for conceptual equivalence cross-nationally (Schulz 2004). 
This means that the items composing the scales have been understood in the same 
way across countries and that the data are thus comparable internationally. Given the 
nested character of the national samples, with one class per school being selected in 
each of the 150-200 sampled schools, the Cived study further allows researchers to 
explore both contextual effects and individual-level factors. We selected the 20 
countries listed in Table 1 for further analyses. This selection represents a cross-
section of the Mons and Cived datasets. 
The Cived study, moreover, is particularly suitable to assess the effect of 
system properties on attitudes as it sampled grade eight, which in many countries is 
the last grade of lower secondary. Education systems show maximum pedagogical 
differentiation in the lower secondary phase, and it may therefore be expected that it 
is in this grade that an effect – if any – can be observed. After the lower secondary 
phase all systems become tracked and selective. A final advantage of the Cived study 
is that its data collection followed that of the Mons dataset by just a few years, 
making the temporal order of and time gap between the two datasets ideal. 
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We selected two composite variables from the database to tap ethnic tolerance 
and patriotism, our two outcomes of interest. These variables have been created by the 
Cived experts (see Torney-Purta et al 2001; Schultz 2004) and represent internally 
coherent composites consisting of the following items, based on Likert-type items 
(i.e., strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree): 
A. Ethnic tolerance (‘positive attitudes toward immigrants’): 
(1) Immigrants should have the opportunity to keep their own language.  
(2) Immigrants’ children should have the same opportunities for education 
that other children in the country have. 
(3) Immigrants who live in a country for several years should have the 
opportunity to vote in elections. 
(4) Immigrants should have the opportunity to keep their own customs and 
lifestyle. 
(5) Immigrants should have all the same rights that everyone else in a country 
has. 
B. Patriotism (‘positive attitudes toward one’s nation’): 
(1) The flag of this country is important to me. 
(2) I have great love for this country. 
(3) This country should be proud of what it has achieved. 
(4) I would prefer to live permanently in another country. 
The higher the values on these variables, the more tolerant and the more patriotic we 
consider the respondent to be. We note that the first and the fourth item of the 
attitudes on immigrants variable clearly tap into the notion of respect for and positive 
acceptance of the cultures of out-groups, which is what ethnic tolerance is essentially 
about for many scholars (e.g., Heyd 1996, Walzer 1997). The other items can also be 
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said to represent ethnic tolerance to the extent that the latter is understood as including 
the principle of civic equality (i.e., accepting cultural others as fundamentally equal 
and entitled to the same rights and opportunities). We further note that the tolerance 
scale is likely to capture ethnic tolerance levels of the native majority only as the 
items all relate to immigrants (i.e., the out-group from the perspective of the native 
majority). Respondents of immigrant background may well have identified with 
immigrants. Consequently, positive answers on the ethnic tolerance items are likely to 
reflect self-assertion rather than ethnic tolerance for this group. 
 
Control Variables 
We further relied on the Cived dataset to select a number of control variables 
at the individual and classroom level. The individual-level controls concern gender, 
use of state language at home (as a proxy for ethnic identity), number of books at 
home (as a proxy for social background), civic knowledge and skills, and an open 
climate for classroom discussion. The last two variables are composite variables 
created by the Cived team (see Appendix 2 [ON-LINE VERSION ONLY] for their 
composition). Previous research has highlighted the importance of some of these 
factors for values and attitudes (for the role of knowledge and skills in enhancing 
civic values, see Galston 2001; for the role of open climate, see Torney-Purta 2004). 
The classroom-level variables concern the social and ethnic composition of the class, 
indicatedby the class average, respectively, of the number of books at home and the 
language spoken at home. 
Finally, we used two control variables at the national level: democratic 
tradition, measured as the number of years of uninterrupted democracy from the 
introduction of universal suffrage, and ethnic diversity, assessed by the 
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fractionalization measure developed by Alberto Alesina et al. (2003).
6
 The importance 
of a history of democracy as a contextual driver of ethnic tolerance has been 
underlined in numerous studies (e.g., Weil 1985; Linz and Stepan 1996). Democratic 
tradition, moreover, has the advantage of being closely related to other possibly 
confounding factors, such as the strength of civic and ethnic identities (as discussed 
before), levels of prosperity and Protestant culture,
7
 and is thus able to broadly 
capture the influence of these factors as well.
8
 In fact, adding the other factors in the 
analysis would only result in multicollinearity problems precisely because they are all 
so closely inter-related. 
We will use ethnic diversity as a control variable in the analysis of patriotism 
as it has been argued that diversity undermines national solidarity (Alesina and 
Glaeser 2004). Consequently, we would expect national identity to be thinner and 
patriotism to be shallower in ethnically diverse states. The control variable is all the 
more important in view of the fact that many federative states are ethnically diverse. 
Including it in the analysis of patriotism therefore enables us to assess the effect of 
territorial differentiation net of that of ethnic diversity. 
 
Data Analysis 
Since our explanatory and control variables are at multiple levels (national, 
classroom and individual) and our dependent variables are at the individual level, we 
will perform multilevel analysis (MLA), using Mlwin software. MLA is necessary 
because of the nested structure of the data. Using more conventional multiple 
regression techniques to analyze nested data would result in an overestimation of the 
effects of higher level variables (Snijders and Bosker 1999), i.e., pedagogical and 
territorial differentiation. 
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MLA also allows us to explore cross-level interaction effects. Such effects can 
be used to determine whether disparities of civic attitudes across social cleavages 
differ across the categories of pedagogical and territorial differentiation. They 
therefore enable us to address Hypotheses One and Two. In sum, we will build a 
three-level model consisting of students (level 1), classrooms (level 2) and countries 
(level 3) and including cross-level interaction terms for individual and country-level 
variables. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Before reporting the results of the MLA, we present descriptive statistics 
(Table 2) and correlations between ethnic tolerance and patriotism (Table 3).  Table 2 
shows the mean values and standard deviations of the dependent variables across the 
categories of pedagogical and territorial differentiation. Levels of tolerance and 
patriotism appear to be lowest in the separation category, i.e., in the states with the 
most pronounced degree of pedagogical differentiation. This is in line with the third 
hypothesis. Respondents are also least patriotic in federal states, the most 
decentralised category of territorial differentiation, which is in agreement with the 
fourth hypothesis. Furthermore, consistent with the second hypothesis we see that the 
dispersion of tolerant and patriotic attitudes is largest in the federal states (as shown 
by the high standard deviations). The descriptive statistics thus all show the 
anticipated patterns. In the ensuing section we will explore whether these 
relationships hold in analyses with control variables at the individual, classroom and 
national level. Appendix 4 [ON-LINE VERSION ONLY] presents the descriptive 
statistics of all the control variables. We only selected control variables with relatively 
small numbers of missing values. 
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[Table 2 about here] 
  
Let us now see how the two outcome measures are interlinked across the 
different categories of territorial and pedagogical differentiation (Table 3). To begin 
with the former, are patriotism and ethnic tolerance more compatible in federal states 
because the national identities of these states are likely to be thinner and less 
exclusive? Surprisingly, we see the reverse pattern appearing: in federal states and in 
states with high levels of school autonomy patriotism and ethnic tolerance are 
negatively correlated while in the other three categories they show a positive 
relationship (see Table 3).  It thus seems unlikely that a federal structure itself 
produces or is indicative of thinner and more inclusive identities. Possibly, this result 
can be explained by the lesser ability of federal states (compared to cenralized ones) 
to overrule local authorities and centrally enforce inclusive identities through the 
curriculum. 
 The pattern of correlations across the categories of pedagogical differentiation 
is also surprising. The negative correlation in the separation group is in line with our 
prediction that the segregated school system of this group is not conducive for 
developing overarching identities. We further see positive correlations in two of the 
three groups of countries with comprehensive systems, suggesting that national 
identities are more inclusive in these countries. However, the correlation tolerance 
and patriotism is negative in the individualized integration group, although we 
predicted that this group of countries, where mixed ability classes are most 
pronounced and where conditions for inter-group contact (and the emergence of 
inclusive identities) are thus most favorable, would show a strong positive 
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association. This unforeseen finding raises doubts about the validity of the causal 
mechanism proposed earlier (i.e., that intergroup contact contributes to intercultural 
understanding and bridging identities). 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
We present the findings of the MLA in a stepwise fashion. First we present the 
zero model – i.e., the equation without explanatory conditions (see the columns 
marked as 0 in Tables 4-7). This provides information on the distribution of the total 
variance across the three levels taking into account all observed and unobserved 
factors. We then discuss the results of the model including our variables of interest 
(one by one) along with control variables at the individual, class and national level 
(Columns I). This allows us to assess the links between system characteristics and 
chosen civic outcomes net of confounding factors.
9
 Finally, we report the models 
including the cross-level interaction terms for ethnic identity and social background 
across the categories of pedagogical and territorial differentiation (Columns II and 
III). 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The zero models show that the proportion of the variance attributable to the 
national level (as indicated by the Intra Class Coefficients (ICC) in the Table) is 4.4% 
for ethnic tolerance and 12.3% for patriotism. According to Greg Duncan and Stephen 
Raudenbusch (1999), these proportions represent moderate to large effect sizes, 
respectively, which justifies the effort to look for explanatory factors at the national 
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level. Had the ICCs at the national level been of a magnitude of one or two per cent, 
we would have known beforehand that system characteristics were unlikely to be 
relevant in accounting for the variation in our two outcomes of interest. 
Let us start by assessing how pedagogical differentiation is related to 
disparities of ethnic tolerance. Are the disparities across the ethnic and social divide 
largest in the system with the most pronounced degree of pedagogical differentiation? 
If so, the correlations between the individual-level conditions of ethnic identity and 
social background, on the one hand, and ethnic tolerance, on the other, should be 
stronger in the separation group. The strength of these correlations can be assessed by 
looking at the interaction effects in conjunction with individual-level main effects. 
These main effects pertain to the reference category (separation). The interaction 
terms of Columns III-V thus show how strong the effects of ethnicity, social 
background and gender in the other categories are in relation to those of the reference 
category. If these interaction terms reinforce their corresponding main effects (by 
showing a significant positive effect on top of a positive main effect or – conversely – 
by showing a significant negative effect on top of a negative main effect), then the 
disparities across the ethnic and social divide are larger in the other categories by 
comparison to the reference category. Conversely, if they diminish the main effect, 
the disparities in the other categories are smaller. Based on this logic, it can be 
observed that five of the six interaction terms dilute the main effect, while one is non-
significant.  
We illustrate the dilution of the main effect by focusing on the effect of ethnic 
identity. The main effect of this factor is -.834 (with an SE of .050) in the reference 
category, meaning that the ethnic majority has significantly lower tolerance levels 
than ethnic minorities in the Separation category.
10
 The corresponding interaction 
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effects are .229 (.088) for the Diverse Integration group, .775 (069) for the Uniform 
Integration group, and .247 (.072) for the Individualized Integration group. Thus, in 
all three categories the interaction effects diminish the negative main effect 
significantly, although these effects are not so large that they change the sign of the 
main effect (i.e., the effect of ethnic identity on ethnic tolerance is also negative in the 
other categories: -.834 + .229 = -.605; -.834 + .775 = -.059; -.834 + .247 = -.587). As 
five out of six interaction terms soften the main effect, we can conclude that 
disparities are indeed smaller in systems with smaller degrees of pedagogical 
differentiation, which supports Hypothesis One. 
It can also be seen that tolerance levels are significantly higher in the 
individualized integration and uniform integration categories than in the separation 
group (i.e., the reference category), when controlling for all other factors including 
democratic tradition (see Column I). This, at first sight, supports the third hypothesis, 
since the categories with the smallest degrees of pedagogical differentiation have the 
highest levels of ethnic tolerance levels. However, the main effect of pedagogical 
differentiation by and large disappears once we add the cross-level interaction effects 
(see Columns II and III). As noted above, many of these interaction effects are 
significant, which leads to the conclusion that it is mainly through influencing the 
effects of ethnic identity and social background that pedagogical differentiation 
impacts on ethnic tolerance.  The smaller the degree of differentiation, the weaker is 
the effect of these individual-level factors. Apparently, systems with the smallest 
degrees of differentiation enhance overall tolerance levels by increasing the tolerance 
levels of the most intolerant social and ethnic groups.   
Why is pedagogical differentiation related in only such an indirect way to 
levels of ethnic tolerance? Possibly, it exerts its effect not so much through 
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segregation, as we proposed earlier, but through the curriculum. Curriculum 
differences across schools are bound to be larger in early tracking systems by 
comparison to comprehensive systems and these may well translate into larger 
tolerance disparities in the former without necessarily producing much lower levels of 
tolerance. Minimal emphasis on fostering civic values in one type of school could, for 
instance, be compensated by elaborate citizenship education programmes in other 
types of schools in early tracking systems resulting in mean levels of tolerance which 
are not much lower than those of systems with uniform curricula. 
In fact, the pattern of links of territorial differentiation with ethnic tolerance 
provides further support for this conjecture. As noted before territorial differentiation 
represents the division of powers precisely on curriculum issues. Similar to 
pedagogical differentiation, it is related to disparities and not to levels of ethnic 
tolerance (see Table 5 – the table shows that only the interaction terms are significant, 
not the main effect of territorial differentiation in Column 1). Moreover, the relation 
with disparities is in full accordance with Hypothesis Two: in all groups the 
disparities across the ethnic and social divide are significantly larger in federal 
systems (the reference category) than in the other systems (see the interaction effects 
of Columns II-III which diminish the main effects)..  In other words, in states where 
the curriculum is most uniform, and curriculum differences between schools are 
consequently minimal, we find smaller disparities across the board. In sum, both 
forms of differentiation seem to exert their impact on ethnic tolerance through the 
curriculum. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
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Let us now see how pedagogical differentiation is related to patriotism (see 
Table 6). The connection between this mode of differentiation and levels of patriotism 
appears to be tenuous: among the three categories of interest it is only in the uniform 
integration category that levels of patriotism are significantly higher than in the 
reference category (separation), controlling for all other factors including ethnic 
diversity. These results support Hypothesis Three only marginally. As pedagogical 
differentiation was alsofound to be only indirectly related to levels of ethnic 
tolerance,the tenuous link with levels of patriotism provides additional support for the 
aforementioned conjecture that the causal mechanism which inspired Hypothesis 
Three does not apply (i.e., the capacity of social and ethnic mixing to generate 
intergroup respect and overarching identities). 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Pedagogical differentiation does not exert a any influence on disparities of 
patriotism. Only in the uniform integration group are inequalities between ethnic 
groups in patriotic sentiments significantly smaller than in the reference category (see 
how the interaction effect dilutes the main effect). However, these inequalities are 
larger in the diverse integration group than in the reference category, which is not in 
line with the first hypothesis. Disparities across social groups are not significantly 
larger or smaller in any of the three groups with comprehensive systems.. We noted 
before that the curriculum is the likely causal mechanism linking pedagogical 
differentiation to disparities of ethnic tolerance. Possibly, the non-relation between 
pedagogical differentiation and disparities of patriotism simply reflects a lack of 
curriculum differentiation across different tracks with regard to issues of national 
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identity and patriotism. It could be that school ethos, content, teaching practice and 
assessment modes simply do not address these issues in either vocational or academic 
tracks, resulting in a fairly similar approach to issues of national identity across 
different types of schools. 
Territorial differentiation shows much stronger links to patriotism, both to 
levels and disparities of this outcome of interest (see Table 7). Levels of patriotism 
are significantly higher in the decentralized and centralized groups compared to the 
reference category (federal states). These higher levels are retained when the 
interaction terms are included (see Columns II and III). The inclusion of interaction 
terms for ethnic identity even has the effect of making patriotism levels higher in all 
four groups relative to the reference category. Clearly, these patterns support 
Hypothesis Four: states with some form of regulation at the national level are more 





[Table 7 about here] 
 
Unlike pedagogical differentiation, territorial differentiation is associated with 
disparities of patriotism, but only with those across ethnic groups. These disparities 
are smaller in all categories by comparison to the reference category. In other words 
ethnic minorities are more similar to native majorities in expressions of patriotism in 
states with some form of national regulation concerning the curriculum. As overall 
levels of patriotism are also higher in the non-federal countries, we would expect 
ethnic minorities in the non-federal states to also show higher levels of patriotism than 
those in the federal states. A difference of means test reveals that this is indeed the 
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case: using state language spoken at home as the proxy for ethic identity, we find that 
respondents who never speak the state language at home express significantly higher 
levels of patriotism in each of the non-federal groups by comparison to the federal 
group.
12
 Evidently, ethnic minority respondents find it easier to identify with their 
country of residence in non-federal states. This is another indication that the kind of 
patriotism promoted in non-federal countries is not ethnocentric and exclusionary. 
  
Conclusion 
This article has shown that system characteristics are related to both levels and 
disparities of ethnic tolerance and patriotism, our outcomes of interest. This is most 
evident for disparities. The more uniform a system is, both in terms of untracked 
mixed ability schools and in terms of a unitary decision-making structure regarding 
curriculum matters, the smaller is the dispersion of tolerant and patriotic attitudes 
across gender, ethnic and social groups. This finding is consistent with the proposition 
that an undifferentiated and nationally regulated school system is most effective in 
preventing segregation and maintaining a commonality of values across schools (Wolf 
and Macedo 2005; Green et al 2006; van der Werfhorst 2007). It further suggests that 
policy makers concerned about pockets of alienation and intolerance among certain 
sections of society ought to consider prolonging the period of common schooling with 
undifferentiated classes and instituting or expanding national regulation on curriculum 
matters. 
The question whether value consensus across social divides is at all desirable 
or feasible in pluralistic liberal democracies has not been addressed here. Obviously, a 
case can be made for value pluralism as a necessary component of a dynamic society 
with a vibrant democracy. Future research will have to explore how value pluralism 
 26 
across social groups relates to social cohesion and democracy in order to determine its 
desirability. 
System characteristics are also related to levels of civic attitudes, although not 
as comprehensively as to disparities. The kind and degree of ability grouping of a 
system is not linked to ethnic tolerance and has only a marginal effect on patriotism. 
This finding is not in line with our hypothesis that tolerance and bridging identities 
would be stronger in comprehensive systems because the mixed-ability classes of 
such systems enable students of different social and cultural backgrounds to come in 
contact and learn about each other. The finding suggests that either the link between 
ability grouping and segregation is not as strong as postulated or that the mechanism 
proposed by contact theory (i.e., interaction between different groups resulting in 
more out-group tolerance and more encompassing identities) does not apply. If the 
latter is the case, this may be because the interaction failed to meet one or more of the 
criteria Gordon Allport (1954) considered essential for inter-ethnic contact to have 
positive effects.  
Rather than through segregation ability grouping seems to have worked 
through the curriculum as this can explain why ability grouping is related to 
disparities of civic attitudes and not so much to levels of civic attitudes. After all, 
while it is easy to see how cross-track curriculum differences can enhance disparities 
in early selection systems, such differences need not affect mean levels of civic 
attitudes if rudimentary civic education programs in some tracks are offset by 
comprehensive programs in other tracks. Van der Werfhorst’s (2007) findings provide 
additional support for this conjecture as he too finds a system’s degree of stratification 
(i.e. extent of grouping by ability and tracking) to be related to cross-track inequalities 
of active citizenship dispositions and not to mean levels of such dispositions. A 
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system’s decision making structure is not related to ethnic tolerance either, but it does 
show a strong link with patriotism: systems with some form of national regulation of 
the curriculum have significantly higher levels of patriotism than federal systems. 
This obviously supports the idea that a uniform curriculum is an effective instrument 
to promote unity and national identity, a belief that has inspired the nation-building 
politics of many newly independent nations (Kolstoe 2000). Interestingly, the patriotic 
attitudes expressed in states with national regulatory frameworks do not appear to be 
of an exclusionary nature as they are positively correlated with ethnic tolerance. What 
is more, in these systems ethnic minorities express higher levels of patriotism than 
those in federal systems, which further indicates that the national identities of the 
former are more inclusive. These findings have important policy implications. They 
suggest that public education does have the ability to foster a national sense of 
belonging that does not reduce tolerance provided this is done through some form of 
national regulation of the curriculum. They are also compatible with the pluralist 
notion that sub-national ethnic affiliations can perfectly well be accommodated within 
an overarching national identity (e.g. Feinberg 1998) and do not support the more 
skeptical view that national identity is difficult to reconcile with other identities since 
it is not culturally neutral (e.g. Kymlicka 1995).   
We end with an important reservation. Although we controlled for various 
macro-level conditions and are thus fairly confident that education system 
characteristics exert an independent effect on civic attitudes, it cannot be ruled out 
that cross-national attitudinal patterns have predated modern education systems. That 
is, perhaps ethnic tolerance and patiotism levels were already high and inequalities 
across social groups low in countries before they introduced common schooling and 
nationwide curricula. Thus, in order to draw more definite conclusions, our cross-
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sectional analyses,need to be supplemented with detailed over-time investigations into 
the effect of system characteristics. 
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Notes
                                                 
1
 These conditions are equality of status, common goals, cooperation,  authority 
support and opportunities for friendship. 
2
 We note here that the (social-democratic) politicians who initiated the reform 
towards comprehensive education in many European countries in the 1960s were not 
primarily motivated by notions of intercultural understanding and bridging identities. 
Considerations of equality, social mobility and class emancipation lay at the heart of 
this reform movement (Wiborg 2009). 
3
 We cannot think of any meaningful theoretical connection between territorial 
differentiation and ethnic tolerance. 
4
 Our theoretical argumentation concerning the effect of pedagogical differentiation 
on value disparities only addresses value disparities across social divides. We 
therefore do not postulate an effect on value disparities in general. This is different for 
territorial differentiation. Clearly, there is every reason to assume an effect of this 
mode of differentiation on value disparities in general, as we explained above. 
5
 The database is available at http://www.iea.nl/cived_datasets.html. 
6
 This measure takes both the number of ethnic groups and the size of each group into 
account, with values approaching one denoting high diversity and values close to zero 
denoting homogeneity. See Alesina et al. (2003) for its calculation. 
7
 Both levels of prosperity (Inglehart and Welzel 2005) and protestant heritage 
(Huntington 2005) have been related to liberal-democratic values including tolerance. 
8
 For instance, using the Migration and Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) as a proxy 
for the strength of ethnic and civic identities (see www.integrationindex.eu), we found 
a strong positive correlation at the national level between history of democracy and 
the prevalence of civic identities (r = .49; p = .011; N = 26). Similarly, democratic 
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tradition is strongly correlated with economic prosperity (as measured with GDP per 
capita) (r = .81; p = .000; N = 31) and with Protestant culture (r = .58; p = .001; N = 
32). [We created a ‘Protestant Culture’ variable with the values ‘0 – not protestant’, ‘1 
– mixed’, and ‘2 – protestant’.] In other words, the longer the history of democracy, 
the stronger the civic identity, the more affluent the country and the more likely the 
country is protestant. We chose democratic tradition as the key control variable rather 
than the MIPEX measure of identity because the latter has data on just 14 of the states 
included in our analyses (see Appendix 3 [ON-LINE VERSION ONLY] for the 
values of all country-level control variables). 
9
 Note that we did not perform analyses with all the system characteristics combined 
because of insufficient observations at the country level (N = 20). 
10
 As the proxy for ethnic identity was the use of the state language at home with 
values <1 – never; 2 – sometimes; 3 – always or almost always>, a negative relation 
means that the more the state language is spoken at home the less tolerant the 
respondent is. 
11
 Importantly, as noted earlier, the kind of patriotism promoted in the decentralized 
and centralized groups appears to be of a fairly inclusive nature given the positive 
correlations of patriotism with ethnic tolerance in these groups (see Table 3). 
12
 In the federal group the mean level of patriotism of these respondents is 8.12. In the 
other groups the corresponding figures are 8.94, 9.29, 10.04; 9.37 and 9.02. These 
values are all significantly higher than 8.12. The international overall mean for 
patriotism is 10. 
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Table 2. Mean Levels of Ethnic Tolerance and Patriotism 
 
 Ethnic Tolerance Patriotism 
 Mean SD N Mean SD N 
Pedagogical Differentiation       
    Separation 9.6 2.01 18,123 9.52 2.03 18,219 
    Diverse Integration 10.0 2.21 8,469 9.75 2.00 8,651 
    Uniform Integration 10.3 1.81 18,982 10.6 1.93 19,081 
    Individualized Integration 10.2 2.19 17,540 10.1 2.04 17,597 
       
Territorial Differentiation       
    Federal States 9.8 2.25 14,405 9.4 2.10 14,550 
    School Autonomy 10.2 2.08 17,273 10.2 2.03 17,393 
    Decentralized States 10.1 1.81 9,035 10.5 1.88 9,080 
    Collaboration 9.6 2.04 5,821 9.8 2.05 5,856 
    Centralized States 10.2 1.93 16,580 10.3 1.95 16,669 
       
Total  10.0 2.06 93000 10.0 2.05 93000 
 
NB1: The differences between the means are all significant at the .001 level 
NB2: It has been argued that standard deviations are not a good measure of dispersion 
since they tend to be low at more extreme mean levels of the outcome of interest. 
However, this bias is not apparent in the data presented here, because there is no clear 
relation between the SDs and the means. That is, it is not the case that SDs of means 




























Table 3. Correlations between ethnic tolerance and patriotism 
 
 





Territorial differentiation   
   Federalism -.098*** 14273 
   School autonomy -.023** 17172 
   Decentralization .172*** 9024 
   Collaboration .119*** 5741 
   Centralism .129*** 16514 
   
Pedagogical differentiation   
   Separation -.05*** 18010 
   Diverse integration .04*** 8371 
   Uniform integration .17*** 18934 
   Individualized integration -.04*** 17409 
 
* P < .05; ** P < .01; *** P < .001 
 
NB1: Admittedly, the correlations, though significant, are rather weak. However, this seems to be the 
product of the sample size and thus does not necessarily reflect non-relationships. Typically large 
sample sizes, such as the ones in this study, tend to depress coefficient values and enhance significance 
levels.  Indeed further exploration using multilevel analysis with cross-level interaction terms revealed 
that the differences in the direction and strength of the correlations between the various categories of 

























Table 4. Determinants of ethnic tolerance – the role of pedagogical differentiation 
 




Gender (girl ref cat)  -.547 (.017) -.548 (.017) -.547 (.017) 
Ethnic identity   -.497 (.028) -.834 (.050) -.492 (.028) 
Social background  .008 (.007) .011 (.007) -.041 (.013) 
Civic competence  .015 (.000) .014 (.000) .015 (.000) 
Open climate for classroom discussion  .148 (.004) .148 (.004) .148 (.004) 
Class Ethnic composition  -.596 (.099) -.591 (.100) -.584 (.099) 






Democratic tradition  -.002 (.003) -.002 (.003) -.002 (.003) 
Pedagogical differentiation     
    Separation (reference category)      
    Diverse integration   .440 (.321) -.227 (.403) .251 (.336) 
    Uniform integration  .579 (.220) -1.69 (.292) .268 (.232) 
    Individualized integration   .533 (.237) -.185 (.313) .211 (.251) 
Diverse integration x ethnic identity   .229 (.088)  
Uniform integration x ethnic identity   .775 (.069)  
Individualized integration x ethnic identity   .247 (.072)  
Diverse integration x social background    .042 (.022) 
Uniform integration x social background    .073 (.018) 
Individualized integration x social background    .072 (.018) 
 ICC national level (L3) (%) 4.4    
 ICC class level (L2) (%) 7.7    
 ICC individual level (L1) (%) 87.9    
 Proportion of  L3 variance explained (%)  32.5 35.5 31.2 
 Proportion of L2 variance explained (%)  14.5 15.7 14.5 
 Proportion of L1 variance explained (%)  7.6 7.7 7.6 
 N (individuals) 63114 55101 55101 55101 
 


























Table 5. Determinants of ethnic tolerance – the role of territorial differentiation 
 




Gender (girl ref cat)  -.547 (.017) -.546 (.017) -.546 (.017) 
Ethnic identity   -.497 (.028) -.944 (.047) -.491 (.028) 
Social background   .008 (.007) .010 (.007) -.050 (.014) 
Civic competence  .015 (.000) .015 (.000) .015 (.000) 
Open climate for classroom discussion  .148 (.004) .149 (.004) .148 (.004) 
Class Ethnic composition  -.595 (.099) -.670 (.099) -.597 (.100) 







Democratic tradition  .002 (.003) .002 (.003) .002 (.003) 
Territorial differentiation     
    Federal states (reference category)     
    School autonomy   .365 (.244) -.715 (.323) .118 (.258) 
    Decentralized states   .370 (.323) -.241 (.475) -.064 (.340) 
    Collaboration   -.098 (.324) -2.05 (.420) -.495 (.344) 
    Centralized states   .465 (.253) -1.91 (.316) .115 (.266) 
    School autonomy x ethnic identity   .378 (.075)  
    Decentralized states x ethnic identity   .953 (.120)  
    Collaboration x ethnic identity   .678 (.096)  
    Centralized states x ethnic identity   .823 (.068)  
    School autonomy x social background    .055 (.019) 
    Decentralized states x social background    .096 (.023) 
    Collaboration x social background    .089 (.025) 
    Centralized states x social background    .081 (.019) 
 ICC national level (L3) (%) 4.4    
 ICC class level (L2) (%) 7.7    
 ICC individual level (L1) (%) 87.9    
 Proportion of  L3 variance explained (%)  23.2 26.3 22.6 
 Proportion of L2 variance explained (%)  14.5 17.2 15.1 
 Proportion of L1 variance explained (%)  7.6 7.7 7.6 
 N (individuals) 63114 55101 55101 55101 
 





























Table 6. Determinants of patriotism – the role of pedagogical differentiation 
 




Gender (girl ref cat)  .227 (.016) .228 (.016) .227 (.016) 
Ethnic identity   .473 (.028) .617 (.049) .472 (.028) 
Social background   .014 (.007) .011 (.007) .011 (.013) 
Civic competence  -.002 (.000) -.002 (.000) -.002 (.000) 
Open climate for classroom discussion  .137 (.004) .137 (.004) .137 (.004) 
Class Ethnic composition  .633 (.092) .619 (.092) .633 (.092) 






Ethnic diversity  -.549 (.993) -.514 (1.00) -.538 (.993) 
Pedagogical differentiation     
    Separation (reference category)      
    Diverse integration   .135 (.407) -.390 (.480) -.050 (.418) 
    Uniform integration   .779 (.385) 2.23 (.435) .827  (.391) 
    Individualized integration   .370 (.397) .513 (.451) .370  (.405) 
Diverse integration x ethnic identity   .181 (.085)  
Uniform integration x ethnic identity   -.497 (.067)  
Individualized integration x ethnic identity   -.048 (.071)  
Diverse integration x social background    .041 (.021) 
Uniform integration x social background    -.012 (.017) 
Individualized integration x social background    .001 (.018) 
 ICC national level (L3) (%) 12.3    
 ICC class level (L2) (%) 6.1    
 ICC individual level (L1) (%) 81.6    
 Proportion of  L3 variance explained (%)  55.7 55.0 55.9 
 Proportion of L2 variance explained (%)  16.9 18.1 17.3 
 Proportion of L1 variance explained (%)  3.3 3.4 3.3 
 N (individuals) 63548 55244 55244 55244 
 



























Table 7. Determinants of patriotism – the role of territorial differentiation 
 




Gender  (girl ref cat)  .227 (.016) .226 (.016) .227 (.016) 
Ethnic identity   .473 (.028) .736 (.046) .471 (.028) 
Social background   .014 (.007) .012 (.007) .013 (.014) 
Civic competence  -.002 (.000) -.002 (.000) -.002 (.000) 
Open climate for classroom discussion  .137 (.004) .137 (.004) .137 (.004) 
Class Ethnic composition  .634 (.092) .661 (.093) .620 (.092) 







Ethnic diversity  -.423 (.949) -.401 (.954) -.419 (.948) 
Territorial differentiation     
    Federal states (reference category)     
    School autonomy   .502 (.405) 1.54 (.460) .550 (.413) 
    Decentralized states   .984 (.408) 2.18 (.536) 1.01 (.420) 
    Collaboration   .518 (.459) 1.48 (.534) .291 (.471) 
    Centralized states   .813 (.401)  2.08 (.447) .828 (.408) 
    School autonomy x ethnic identity   -.358 (.073)  
    Decentralized states x ethnic identity   -.411 (.117)  
    Collaboration x ethnic identity   -.333 (.094)  
    Centralized states x ethnic identity   -.437 (.066)  
    School autonomy x social background    -.011 (.018) 
    Decentralized states x social background    -.005 (.022) 
    Collaboration x social background    .051 (.025) 
    Centralized states x social background    -.004 (.018) 
 ICC national level (L3) (%) 12.3    
 ICC class level (L2) (%) 6.1    
 ICC individual level (L1) (%) 81.6    
 Proportion of  L3 variance explained (%)  47.4 46.8 47.4 
 Proportion of L2 variance explained (%)  16.9 17.7 17.3 
 Proportion of L1 variance explained (%)  3.3 3.3 3.3 
 N (individuals) 63548 55244 55244 55244 
 




















Appendix 1 [ON-LINE VERSION ONLY]. Social Cohesion Values in the 
Curriculum 
 
A brief review of education policies of several western countries reveals that 
ethnic tolerance and patriotism are indeed prominent objectives in the curriculum. 
Ethnic tolerance, phrased alternatively as respect for people with different views 
and/or cultural backgrounds and intercultural understanding/competence, is addressed 
in many policy documents. Thus, in the Netherlands one of the key national targets on 
citizenship for lower secondary education says that “pupils should learn to appreciate 
the societal value of respect for each other’s views and lifestyles” (Government of the 
Netherlands 2008). Similarly, in the commentary to the cross-curricular theme of 
intercultural education, the government of Lower Saxony in federal Germany states 
that “In view of the internationalisation of all sections of society and the 
diversification of lifestyles, intercultural competence is a key skill for all children and 
adolescents” (Government of Lower Saxony 2008). Likewise, in Great Britain the 
National Curriculum for England and Wales states that Citizenship Education should 
foster respect for different national, religious and ethnic identities and encourage 
pupils to challenge injustice and discrimination (Government of the United Kingdom 
2008). In sum, schools are expected to promote intercultural respect and equal 
treatment as key qualities pupils should acquire in order to function well as future 
citizens in pluralistic democracies.  
Likewise it is not difficult to find evidence of patriotism being promoted. 
Interestingly, even many politicians on the left, who usually are very critical of 
attempts to enhance national unity, have dropped their reservations. For instance, in a 
famous speech to the Fabian Society in January 2006, Gordon Brown, who was then 
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chancellor of the Labour government, called on the political left to overcome their 
traditional fear of patriotism and “embrace the Union flag”, stating that “We have to 
be clearer now about how diverse cultures which inevitably contain differences can 
find the essential common purpose without which no society can flourish” (BBC 
News 2008).  Other countries have already put policies in place with the explicit 
purpose of enhancing national identity. The Netherlands for instance has created a 
national historical guideline (‘Canon van Nederland’) containing 50 ‘windows’ of 
important persons and events in Dutch political history, which lower secondary 
education will be required to use from 1 January 2009. The advisory council that 
initiated the guideline motivated it by stating that the guideline was “an expression of 
our cultural identity” and that “particularly today our collective memory needs proper 
maintenance” (Canoncommissie 2008). Likewise, in Japan, the neo-conservative 
government headed by Koizumi initiated reforms aimed at restoring the feeling of 
national belonging and developing a “public spirit” (Nanta, 2009). The reforms 
included a new ceremony for playing the national anthem and flying the flag at 
school. Similarly, in France, teaching the national anthem La Marseillaise has become 
compulsory since the adoption of the 2005 Act on the Orientation and Program of the 
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      forthcoming in Revue Française de Pédagogie, 165.\
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Appendix 2. [ON-LINE VERSION ONLY] Composition of Index Variables 
 
 
Civic knowledge and skills – This scale consists of a 38 items civic knowledge and 
skills test. 
 
Open climate for classroom discussion (rated either as never, rarely, sometimes, or 
often): 
1. ‘Students feel free to disagree openly with their teachers about political and 
social issues during class’ 
2. ‘Students are encouraged to make up their own minds about issues’ 
3. ‘Teachers respect our opinion and encourage us to express them during class’ 
4. ‘ Students feel free to express opinions in class even when their opinions are 
different from most of the other students’ 
5. ‘Teachers encourage us to discuss political or social issues about which people 
have different opinions’ 
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Au       . 51.00 25970.00 39.00 .00 
Aus      .11 97.00 20050.00 . 1.00 
BeFr     .56 51.00 24510.00 69.00 .00 
Bul      .40 9.00 1380.00 . .00 
Can      . 79.00 19320.00 67.00 1.00 
Chi      .19 9.00 4740.00 . .00 
Cyp      . 25.00 . 39.00 .00 
Cze      .32 9.00 5060.00 48.00 .00 
Den      .08 81.00 32030.00 44.00 1.00 
Eng      .12 71.00 22640.00 63.00 1.00 
Est      . 9.00 3480.00 46.00 1.00 
Fin      .13 92.00 23780.00 67.00 1.00 
Fra      . 54.00 23480.00 55.00 .00 
Ger      .17 51.00 25350.00 53.00 .50 
Gre      .16 24.00 11770.00 40.00 .00 
Hun      .15 9.00 4650.00 48.00 .50 
Ire      . 76.00 19160.00 53.00 .00 
Ita      .11 43.00 19710.00 65.00 .00 
Lat      . 9.00 2470.00 30.00 1.00 
Lit      . 9.00 2620.00 45.00 .00 
NL       . 77.00 24320.00 68.00 .50 
Nor      .06 84.00 32880.00 64.00 1.00 
Pol      .12 9.00 3960.00 44.00 .00 
Por      .05 25.00 10600.00 79.00 .00 
Rom      .31 9.00 1520.00 . .00 
Rus      .25 8.00 2270.00 . .00 
Slk      . 9.00 3590.00 40.00 .00 
Slo      . 9.00 9890.00 55.00 .00 
Sp       . 25.00 14000.00 61.00 .00 
Swe      .06 78.00 25040.00 88.00 1.00 
Swi      .53 28.00 38350.00 50.00 .50 
USA      .49 79.00 30600.00 . 1.00 
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  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Gender 64273 1 (girl) 2 (boy) 1.49 .500 
Use of state language at 
home 
58052 1 (never) 3 (always) 2.91 .328 
Number of books at home 64147 1 (none) 6 ( > 200) 4.29 1.351 
Civic knowledge and skills 
(scale) 
64573 9.47 165.19 101.3823 20.39930 
Open climate (scale) 62283 2.58 15.54 10.0948 2.05145 
Ethnolinguistic composition 
of class 
64794 1.57 3.00 2.9117 .15236 
Social composition of class 64799 1.63 6.00 4.2863 .74030 
Democratic tradition 64820 17.00 106.00 50.9291 32.24855 
Ethnic diversity 64820 .05 .56 .21 .15 
 
 
